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Abstract. Nowadays many firms seek hard-to-imitate assets via allying with or acquiring 
other firms that own desired resources. As such, how to choose between alliances and 
acquisitions becomes a critical decision, and one important determinant is interfirm fac-
tors. This study probes three crucial yet underexplored interfirm differences, and develops 
scales to capture managers’ perceptions of the differences that, based on managerial cog-
nition literature, dictate the ally-versus-acquire choice. Further, we argue that managers 
adjust their judgement across varying objective conditions. Each perceived difference is 
thus paired with a moderator identified respectively from the resource-based view, com-
petitive dynamics, and collaborative capability literature. Evidences on Taiwanese firms 
show that a larger resource-deployment difference enhances acquisition likelihood, while 
greater differences in marketing praxis and human resource management increase alliance 
formation. Moreover, the resource-deployment difference leads to alliances for relatively 
younger partners, and the difference in human resource management favors acquisitions 
when focal firms have more interfirm governance experience. 
Keywords: ally-versus-acquire decision, governance mode choice, alliance, acquisition, 
interfirm difference, subjective assessment, objective condition.
JEL Classification: L10, L20, L21, L24, L60, M10, O53, P13.
Introduction
Alliances and acquisitions are vehicles through which firms access hard-to-imitate 
assets owned by others (Cuypers et al. 2017; Wassmer et al. 2017). Although both 
practices entail interfirm interaction and coordination, alliances (whether equity- or 
nonequity-based) are exercised by cooperation between firms that maintain their 
independent identities and ownerships (Lioukas et al. 2016; Reuer, Devarakonda 2016), 
while acquisitions are executed via internalization in which a target firm surrenders its 
ownership and control to the acquirer (Glendening et al. 2016; Graffin et al. 2016). 
These two governance modes have distinct advantages and disadvantages. It is thus 
important for firms to understand when to choose one over the other. One determinant 
long recognized in the literature is interfirm differences, and previous research tends to 
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rely heavily on objective proxies to capture the differences (Wang, Zajac 2007; Yang 
et al. 2010). 
Though insightful, there are limitations to assess interfirm differences using objective 
measures. First, objective indicators do not reflect managers’ cognitive interpretations 
and diagnoses of other firms. As the managerial cognition literature suggests, firms’ 
strategic choices are shaped largely by how top executives conceive and diagnose their 
competitive environments (Ginsberg 1994). Second, recent research (Bauer, Matzler 
2014) shows that managers consider both subjective evaluations and objective infor-
mation simultaneously. A disconnection between subjective and objective assessments 
prevents us from developing a finer-grained explanation for the ally-versus-acquire de-
cision. 
This research aims to address the above gaps by asking: How do perceptions of in-
terfirm differences affect the choice between alliances and acquisitions, and how are 
these influences contingent on hard-fact conditions? Our study makes at least three 
important contributions. First, we expand the interfirm-difference discussion to three 
critical organizational routines (deploying resources, exercising marketing praxes, and 
managing employees) that need more investigation as Lavie et al. (2012) suggested. 
These underexplored interfirm differences deserve attention in the ally-versus-acquire 
decision because firms use either strategy to achieve resource-, market-, and efficiency-
seeking goals. Second, this study is the first to capture managers’ assessment of those 
interfirm differences that, according to the managerial cognition literature, determines 
the governance mode choice. Third, we contribute by analyzing how these interfirm 
differences interact with objective conditions (firm age, industry sectors, and interfirm 
experience) to impact the ally-versus-acquire preference. Our argument can be extended 
to other strategic settings, such as foreign market entry, which have long perplexed 
managers and scholars. 
In the following sections we compare alliances and acquisitions, and develop our 
conceptual framework. Next, we describe methods. Then, we report results, followed 
by conclusions that state contributions and suggest future directions.
1. Literature and hypotheses
Alliances and acquisitions have their own advantages and disadvantages (please see 
Table 1 for a comparison). To decide between them, firms ought to weigh which strategy 
could bring more benefits than drawbacks under various conditions. In relation to this, 
managers develop and use their mental models to make decisions. A mental model is 
a managerial perception reflecting a “knowledge framework that selects and actively 
modifies experience in order to arrive at a coherent, unified, expectation-confirming 
and knowledge-consistent representation of an experience” (Alba, Hasher 1983: 203). 
However, managers’ cognitive assessments likely reflect an incomplete picture in com-
plex information environments. Likewise, using only objective data and overlooking 
managers’ knowledge of a subject is problematic. There is thus a need to examine si-
multaneously the subjective and objective scanning of internal and external information 
for the ally-versus-acquire choice.
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Table 1. Comparison of key characteristics between alliances and acquisitions
Features Alliance Acquisition
Definition
A voluntary agreement between firms 
that share resources for co-development 
or co-provision of products and 
services
A corporate action in which one firm 
buys the ownership stakes of a target 
firm in order to assume control of the 
target firm
Practice
Exercised by cooperation between firms 
that maintain independent identities and 
ownership
Executed via internalization where a 
target firm surrenders its control and 
ownership to the acquirer
Coordination
Coordination is sustained by discrete 
negotiations and mutual expectations of 
reciprocity
Coordination is sustained mostly through 
managerial fiat within the hierarchy
Flexibility 
More flexible in that allying firms 
can adjust the form of partnerships to 
respond to unexpected changes
Riskier and less flexible due to a 
significant, irreversible financial payment 
for completing the deal
Control over 
desired assets
Absence of formal managerial fiat does 
not guarantee full control over the 
desired assets possessed by partners
Being under a common ownership and 
managerial authority gives the acquirer a 




Less severe as allying firms can 
cooperate only in the areas that are 
mutually beneficial
More severe as an acquisition often 




Incomplete contracts brought by 
bounded rationality likely expose 
allying firms to threats of partners’ 
opportunism, such as hold-up, leakage 
of know-how, and so on
Information asymmetry between the 
acquirer and the target likely leads to 
adverse selection, as the acquirer cannot 
ascertain the true value of the target 
Managerial 
challenge
Lack of a common control system 
and laying governance scheme on 
incomplete contracts are harmful to 
solving conflicts
Integration of the acquirer and the 
target under a common ownership 
and managerial authority is costly and 
complex
We identify three critical organizational routines, and argue that the effects of the three 
perceived interfirm differences are moderated by respective objective conditions. Ac-
cording to the resource-based view, resource-deployment differences represent each 
firm’s unique trajectories of competency development, and firm age is a crucial objec-
tive indicator that hints at the logic of a firm’s resource allocation to outsiders (Werner-
felt 1984; Winter 2003). Marketing-praxis differences allude to potential competitive 
relationships, and this competitive intensity differs between high- and low-tech segment 
(Czarnitzki, Thorwarth 2012; Hagedoorn, Duysters 2002). The differences in human 
resource management denote managerial challenges facing alliance or acquisition par-
ticipants, and their prior interfirm governance experience (known as collaboration ca-
pability) affects how they tackle the managerial difficulties (Ellis et al. 2011; Madsen, 
Desai 2010). Figure 1 illustrates our conceptual framework.
376
C.-H. Tseng. Solving the ally-versus-acquire dilemma through the dual lenses of subjective and objective views
1.1. Resource deployment and relative firm age
1.1.1. Effects of perceived differences in resource deployment
Resource deployment refers to the commitment of resources to specific areas that are 
converted into rent-generating capabilities over time (Kor, Mahoney 2005). According 
to the resource-based view, resource deployment dictates what capabilities firms are 
equipped with, and the capabilities are often not perfectly mobile and imitable across 
firms (Barney 1991). A large difference in resource deployment between firms suggests 
that these firms are more likely to possess knowledge and competencies substantially 
divergent from each other. In this case, an acquisition becomes a better vehicle than an 
alliance for firms aiming to obtain the knowledge and/or capabilities held by others. 
First, because of disparate trajectories of resource deployment between two firms, it 
is difficult for a focal firm, as an outsider, to make sense of how another firm uses its 
resources. Becoming an insider via acquisitions can overcome this causal ambiguity. 
Second, although acquirers may confront challenges in gauging targets’ competency 
value and assimilating knowledge when there is a large interfirm resource-deployment 
difference (Carayannopoulos, Auster 2010), alliances also expose participants to similar 
Fig. 1. The conceptual framework
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types of risks, including poor partner selection and low absorptive capacity (Fonti et al. 
2017; Holloway, Parmigiani 2016). 
Taken together, because of resource inimitability and immobility in the situation of 
greater resource-deployment differences, an acquisition is a more feasible mode than 
an alliance for a focal firm to obtain the desired knowledge and competencies while 
maintaining the value embedded in the target company. 
H1a: Other things being equal, a greater perceived interfirm difference in resource 
deployment is associated with the choice of an acquisition over an alliance. 
1.1.2. Moderation of relative firm age
Stressing idiosyncratic paths of organizational growth across firms, the resource-
based view (Wernerfelt 1984) and the capability perspective (Winter 2003) have long 
implied the crucial role of firm age in the deployment of resources and development 
of capabilities. 
Focal firms facing younger candidates prefer alliances, as the concerns about asset 
immobility and inimitability brought by large resource-deployment differences can be 
alleviated. Many scholars note that newer firms usually have a lower level of struc-
tural complexity, which means a more direct connection between employees’ efforts 
and the firms’ outputs (Kotha et al. 2011). This so-called causal clarity constitutes the 
prerequisite for learning and imitation to occur in alliances, and the need of using 
acquisitions to overcome inimitability becomes weaker. Besides, firms develop their 
capabilities under a sequence of historical circumstances, and their capabilities are 
generally embedded within the social fabric of the firm. A shorter corporate history 
thus makes it less complicated for other companies to duplicate the competencies. 
In sum, younger candidates relative to the focal firms can mitigate concerns over 
resource immobility and inimitability, and thus increase the likelihood of choosing an 
alliance over an acquisition.
H1b: The younger the candidate is relative to the focal firm, the more likely that a 
greater perceived interfirm difference in resource deployment is associated with 
the choice of an alliance over an acquisition.
1.2. Marketing praxis and industry segment
1.2.1. Effects of perceived differences in marketing praxis
Marketing praxis is a set of actions that firms undertake to sell products or services. 
It involves determining what products or services to offer, which customer segment(s) 
to target, how to reach the potential consumers, and what pricing position to maintain 
vis-à-vis competitors’ offerings (Coviello et al. 2000). Larger interfirm differences in 
marketing praxis denote that firms operate in distinct competitive landscapes, and thus 
possess differing market expertise; in contrast, firms are very likely to be more direct 
competitors if their marketing praxes are similar. 
Being direct competitors makes it particularly critical for each firm to protect its own 
market information and marketing plans from leaking to the other. This leakage issue 
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is exacerbated in alliances that generate substantial economic conflicts in overlapping 
territories during the period of partnership (Abdi, Aulakh 2017), yet do not exist in 
acquisitions that reduce competition in the market. 
Meanwhile, due to the fear of revealing market knowledge to rivals, allying with direct 
competitors usually creates shallow cooperation within a limited scope (Oxley, Sampson 
2004). Further, when partners are direct competitors, it approximates a zero-sum game 
where a firm’s financial performance is subject to its ability to position its strengths 
against rivals’ weaknesses, and knowledge gained from the alliance would be applied 
by each partner in the same competitive arena (Holloway, Parmigiani 2016). As such, 
the payoff from misbehavior in the alliance is particularly high, which would stimulate 
greater opportunism in the partnership. 
All of the above reasons lead to the preference for acquisitions when partnering firms 
are more similar in their marketing praxes, but the selection of alliances when they have 
greater marketing-praxis differences. 
H2a: Other things being equal, a greater perceived interfirm difference in marketing 
praxis is associated with the choice of an alliance over an acquisition. 
1.2.2. Moderation of industry segments
Firms in high-tech sectors are required to invest heavily in R&D for developing 
innovative technologies as the source of their competitiveness (Czarnitzki, Thorwarth 
2012). Competing in a high-tech industry confronts firms with a more dynamic 
environment that creates high levels of uncertainty and makes technologies obsolete 
more rapidly. In comparison, low-tech industrial environments are relatively stable and 
have longer product life cycles, which enable firms to pursue refinement of existing 
technologies (Hagedoorn, Duysters 2002). 
Prior studies have noted that frequent changes in market conditions are associated with 
a disproportionate preference for a more flexible organizational form, such as alliances 
(e.g. Lioukas et al. 2016). This is because new knowledge expires quickly and nimble 
strategic actions are needed for firms to survive in high-tech sectors. Timely learning 
from partners through a loosely organizational, collaborative form appears more appro-
priate than pursuing formal control in acquisitions, which involve complex integration 
processes. The rapid obsolescence of technologies and shorter product life cycles in 
high-tech industries accentuate the problem of lengthy integration in acquisitions, which 
would create windows for rivals to catch up. 
By contrast, in low-tech markets the governance decision tends to be the opposite for 
partners with more distinct marketing praxes. Less volatile environments in low-tech 
markets exacerbate the concern about leaking proprietary market knowledge to alliance 
partners from other areas, due to great potential of creating future competitors who 
gain more from the appropriation in the slow-moving setting. However, less dynamic 
business environments enable acquirers to better detect the intentions and value of 
candidates, and allow a longer grace period for acquirers to deal with integration before 
new factors emerge (Hagedoorn, Duysters 2002). 
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H2b: In a high-tech (low-tech) sector, a greater perceived interfirm difference in 
marketing praxis is associated with the choice of an alliance (acquisition) over 
an acquisition (alliance).
1.3. Human resource management and interfirm governance experience
1.3.1. Effects of perceived differences in human resource management
Human resource (HR) management refers to the art of exercising authority, strengthening 
the bonds among employees based on a common platform, and motivating them to work 
together as a unified unit (Som 2003). HR management style is linked to organizational 
culture, which is the collective programming of the mind that distinguishes the members 
of one group of people from another (Datta 1991). As such, individuals at different 
organizations are inclined to form their own work approaches and develop their unique 
leadership practices. When there are large interfirm differences in HR management, 
more conflicts are likely to occur between firms. 
The issue of significant HR management differences is more problematic in acquisi-
tions than in alliances. Acquisitions entail integration of workforces from acquired and 
acquiring firms that may have diametrically opposed managerial styles (Wang et al. 
2016). Research on trust thinks that clashes among members belonging to different 
groups stem from their divergent managerial schemes, where perceptual biases build 
and mutual trust erodes (Kramer 1999). As anecdotal evidence shows that employees in 
the acquired firms often react unfavorably to the change in ownership (Guerrero 2008), 
a lack of trust between the acquired and the acquiring parties due to significant HR 
management differences will make those employees feel uncertain with regard to their 
career patterns, mobility, and development. Such problems pose substantial obstacles 
in integration and prevent realization of the acquisition’s benefits. 
In comparison, alliances are a more appropriate governance choice, since higher flexibil-
ity allowed in such collaborations offers more room and time to deal with the tension, 
distrust, and hostility due to significant HR management differences between partners 
(Hoehn-Weiss et al. 2017). Thus, alliances appear to provide a buffer zone for smoothing 
out interfirm managerial collisions. 
H3a: Other things being equal, a greater perceived interfirm difference in HR 
management is associated with the choice of an alliance over an acquisition. 
1.3.2. Moderation of prior interfirm governance experience
When facing candidates with different HR management styles, firms possessing 
more interfirm governance experience of alliances and acquisitions are likely to have 
a stronger preference for acquisitions over alliances. First, after firms have made a 
considerable number of acquisitions, they tend to develop routines that can serve as a 
blueprint for and can be replicated on new acquisitive activities. These routines contain 
preferred approaches, speeds, and sequences of integration. Because routines frequently 
embody and exert inertial forces, prior experience increases the likelihood of subsequent 
acquisitions (Zollo 2009). 
380
C.-H. Tseng. Solving the ally-versus-acquire dilemma through the dual lenses of subjective and objective views
Second, insofar as alliance experience is concerned, it is also conducive to undertaking 
more acquisitions. Forming alliances involves partner selection, contract negotiation and 
enforcement, and interfirm coordination (Krishnan et al. 2016). These procedures are 
similar to those in acquisitions, which involve target selection, negotiation and stipulation 
of acquisitive deals, and interfirm integration. The similarities between alliance and 
acquisition practices give firms opportunities to accumulate relevant knowledge about 
conducting acquisitions. 
H3b: The more prior interfirm governance experience that the focal firm possesses, the 
more likely that a greater perceived interfirm difference in HR management is 
associated with the choice of an acquisition over an alliance. 
2. Methods
2.1. Data and sample
We tested our hypotheses on a sample of alliances and acquisitions made by Taiwanese 
manufacturers. We chose this context for four reasons. First, Taiwanese firms have 
engaged heavily in allying with or acquiring other firms so as to gain strong footholds in 
global marketplaces. Second, firms in the manufacturing industry have intensive involve-
ment in alliances and acquisitions. Third, limiting observations to the manufacturers 
from one country helps minimize home-country and industry effects. Fourth, our focus 
on alliances or acquisitions taking place between high-tech firms or between low-tech 
firms allows us to examine how the ally-versus-acquire choice varies across the two 
industries. 
We collected the data in 2013 through a questionnaire mail survey. A list of alliances and 
acquisitions conducted during 2010 and 2012 was first compiled from the Securities Data 
Company (SDC) database. The focal firm in an alliance is the Taiwanese participant if 
it is an international alliance and the dominant partner (holding more equity for equity-
based alliances, or initiating the cooperation for non-equity ones) in a domestic alliance, 
while the focal firm in an acquisition is the Taiwanese acquirer. The above sampling 
frame yielded 345 alliances and 360 acquisitions. 
Our key informants are senior executives with titles such as general managers or chief 
executive officers, and all were involved in the alliances or acquisitions. The types of 
industry that their firms operated in comprise (electronics, communication, and com-
puter) equipment manufacturing, food processing, textile, and metal fabrication. On 
average, the age of their firms is around 30 years up to the event date, and their size 
approximates 10,000 employees.
The development of our questionnaire was guided by theoretical considerations, previous 
literature, and consultation with experts. We first developed the questionnaire in English 
and then translated it into Chinese. To ensure item equivalence in both languages, we 
back translated from Chinese to English, and compared the two versions. The scales 
were reverse-coded where appropriate to reduce social desirability bias. We pre-tested 
our Chinese questionnaire with 20 senior managers and then refined items. 
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After the initial mailing and two waves of reminders, we received a total of 141 
completed and usable surveys for a 20% response rate, which is comparable to that of 
other recent studies conducted in Taiwan (Contractor et al. 2005). Table 2 summarizes 
respondent profiles by governance choices. To check nonresponse bias, we performed 
t-tests to compare the participants on the initial list of 345 alliances and 360 acquisitions 
with those who returned our surveys using information available from secondary sourc-
es. The results of insignificant differences suggest no nonresponse bias. 
Table 2. Respondent firm profiles (N = 141)
Acquisition (N = 63) Alliance (N = 78)
Resource deployment differences (mean value) 5.42 4.55
HR management differences (mean value) 4.39 5.05
Marketing praxis differences (mean value) 4.01 3.58
Institutional distance (mean value) 1.65 1.45
Relative firm age (Log transformed mean value) 1.09 3.08
Prior governance experience (mean value) 2.83 2.17
Industry segments
High-tech (number of firms)






Governance mode choice, alliances versus acquisitions, was captured by a dummy 
variable in which 1 indicates an acquisition and 0 represents an alliance. Consistent with 
the definition discussed in prior studies (Carayannopoulos, Auster 2010), our acquisitive 
cases all have a controlling interest of over 50%, and our alliance sample includes both 
non-equity and equity-based forms of partnership. 
2.3. Independent variables
Based on our literature review, resource-deployment differences were assessed on four 
critical organizational resources (Tseng et al. 2007). Following Homburg and Bucerius 
(2006), we measured marketing-praxis differences with five items concerning target 
customers, product or service features, distribution channels, and pricing positioning. 
Adapted from Datta (1991), we used five items to gauge HR-management differences in 
output- /process-oriented, bureaucratic/unbureaucratic, punishment/reward, hierarchical/
egalitarian, and authoritative/participative dimensions. Table 3 lists these items.
2.4. Moderators
We computed relative firm age by subtracting the age of a candidate firm from the 
age of the focal firm. A greater value indicates a younger candidate relative to the 
focal firm. The alliances or acquisitions participated in by pairs of firms operating in 
high-tech industries were coded “1” and “0” for the pairs in low-tech industries. We 
distinguished between low- and high-tech segments based on the definitions given by 
the US Department of Labor (Hecker 2005) and the guidelines suggested by Kile and 
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Phillips (2009). Focal firms’ prior interfirm governance experience was gauged by the 
cumulative number of alliances and acquisitions that the focal firms had undertaken 
since their founding up to the year of the focal events. 
2.5. Control variables
We controlled for four variables influential to governance mode choice in previous 
studies (Yang et al. 2010; Zhou et al. 2016). Firm size difference was measured by 
calculating the difference between two firms in the number of employees. We adopted 
the composite index introduced by Kogut and Singh (1988) to assess institutional 
distance between the home country of a candidate and that of a focal firm. Ex-ante 
performance was gauged by focal firms’ satisfaction with market share and profitability 
before the focal event (1 = strongly dissatisfied to 7 = strongly satisfied). Risk percep-
tion asks respondents about their assessment of creating potential competitors, leaking 
proprietary assets, and losing competitive advantages (1 = strongly disagree to 7 = 
strongly agree).







Interfirm differences in resource deployment (anchored on a 
seven-point Likert scale, 1 = strongly similar to 7 = strongly 
different)
Compare your firm with the candidate firm:
Allocate resources to boost R&D intensity
Allocate resources to enhance manufacturing efficiency
Allocate resources to improve financial position 






Interfirm differences in marketing praxis (anchored on a seven-
point Likert scale, 1 = strongly agree to 7 = strongly disagree)
Compare your firm with the candidate firm:
Target at the same groups of customers 
Offer products/services made with the same technology 
Offer products/services identical in quality
Sell products/services through the same channels 







Interfirm differences in HR management (anchored on a seven-
point Likert scale, 1 = strongly similar to 7 = strongly different)
Compare your firm and the candidate firm:
Encourage employees to try new and better ways of doing a job
Define each employee’s duty clearly
Give more praise and recognition than punishments to 
motivate employees
Treat employees equally and as family members







Fit Indices: χ2 = 121.60, d.f. = 62, p < .001; NNFI = .96; CFI = .97; RMSEA = .07
Note: *Item was dropped during the measure validation process.
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2.6. Measure validation
Confirmatory factor analyses assessed the convergent and discriminant validity of all 
variables measured on reflective scales (Gerbing, Anderson 1988). The results indicate 
a reasonable fit for the model (χ2 = 121.60, d.f. = 62, p < 0.001; NNFI = 0.96; CFI = 
0.97; RMSEA = 0.07). All the indicators loaded substantively (0.68 or above) and sig-
nificantly on their hypothesized factors (p < 0.001). Average variance extracted ranged 
from 0.57 to 0.63, and construct reliabilities from 0.86 to 0.87 (Nunnally, Bernstein 
1994). With regard to evidence of discriminant validity, in all cases the average vari-
ance extracted by each factor exceeded the squared correlation between the factor pair 
(Fornell, Larcker 1981). Establishing discriminant validity using the average variance 
extracted measure also protects against the deleterious effects of multicollinearity in the 
presence of measurement error (Grewal et al. 2004). The confirmatory factor analysis 
results are shown in Table 3.
One concern with survey measures is the presence of common method variance. We 
used the Harman one-factor test to examine this issue (Podsakoff, Organ 1986), an 
approach routinely used in the literature (Newbert 2008). The factor analysis of the 
variables used in the regression models did not yield one single factor and the first fac-
tor did not account for the majority of the variance (only 18.5%), indicating no serious 
common method variance. 
3. Results
Table 4 reports the descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix. Our binary depen-
dent variable dictates us to use binomial logistic regression in which positive coeffi-
cients signify that independent variables or interaction terms increase the probability of 
choosing acquisitions over alliances. To minimize multicollinearity, we mean centered 
our constructs before creating interaction terms. Table 5 shows the results of our hy-
potheses testing. Model I reports the results with only the control variables, Models II, 
III, and IV with the addition of three sets of main effects and interactions, and Model V 
the full model. The full model has much better fitness (Chi-square = 63.27, p < 0.001; 
Cox & Snell R-square = 0.362) than other models, showing the adequate explanatory 
power of our conceptual framework.
H1a postulated that an acquisition is more preferable than an alliance for larger re-
source-deployment differences, and the results support the hypothesis (b = 0.450, p 
< 0.01). Taking into account the moderating effect of relative firm age, alliances are 
more favorable than acquisitions for a relatively younger target (b = –0.025, p < 0.001), 
showing support for H1b. H2a proposed that greater marketing-praxis differences will 
favor an alliance more than an acquisition, and we found support for this (b = –0.400, 
p < 0.10). Our results do not support H2b that firms in high-tech sectors tend to choose 
alliances, while those in low-tech sectors acquisitions, in order to manage marketing-
praxis differences (b = 0.420, p > 0.10). H3a posited that increased HR-management 
differences make alliances more favorable than acquisitions, and we found support for 
this (b = –0.631, p < 0.01). We also obtained support for H3b that greater interfirm 
governance experience strengthens the possibility of using acquisitions rather than 
alliances for tackling large interfirm HR-management differences (b = 1.101, p < 0.10).
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Table 4. Descriptive statistics and correlations














–0.13 –0.28* –0.05 1.00
5. Relative  




0.13 0.16 0.01 –0.28* 0.19* 1.00
7. Industry 
Segments 0.32* 0.12 0.02 –0.12 0.08 0.10 1.00
8. Institutional 
Distance 0.04 –0.13 0.04 –0.11 –0.11 0.15 0.19* 1.00
9. Ex-ante 
Performance –0.03 0.06 0.27* 0.23* –0.09 –0.01 0.04 0.05 1.00
10. Risk 
Perception 0.13 0.07 –0.07 0.11 0.09 0.10 0.04 –0.09 0.12 1.00
Mean 0.45 4.94 4.75 3.77 6.14 2.64 0.59 1.54 5.10 3.59
Standard 
Deviation 0.50 1.45 1.32 1.62 29.45 0.30 0.49 2.67 1.43 1.37
Note: * p < 0.05.
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We plotted the patterns of significant moderating effects. As Figure 2 shows, the propen-
sity to choose alliances increases when a candidate firm is relatively younger and there 
is a rising interfirm resource-deployment difference. By contrast, in the case where a 
candidate firm is older, the increasing interfirm resource-deployment difference is more 
likely to lead to the choice of acquisitions. As demonstrated in Figure 3, the probability 
of choosing acquisitions is higher for firms with more interfirm governance experience 
when there is a large interfirm HR-management difference. 
Table 5. Binomial logistic regression results (acquisition = 1and alliance = 0)
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Cox & Snell R2 0.033 0.202 0.178 0.105 0.362
Chi-square 4.69 31.83*** 27.63*** 15.65* 63.27***
Notes: +p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001; standard errors are in the parentheses.
386
C.-H. Tseng. Solving the ally-versus-acquire dilemma through the dual lenses of subjective and objective views
Conclusions
This study makes several important contributions. First, subjective assessments have 
been underexplored in the ally-versus-acquire choice research. This study analyzes how 
managers’ perceptions of interfirm differences affect this decision, and further recog-
nizes the importance of combining subjective and objective evaluations in this decision. 
Second, as resource deployment concerns the development of proprietary knowledge, 
this study suggests using acquisitions to tackle this interfirm difference and to obtain de-
sired knowhow. In comparison, as to managerial differences in such areas as marketing 
praxis and HR management, alliances are more suitable to buffer interfirm conflicts. 
Third, the significant moderating role of relative firm age supports the resource-based 
view that assets with a history-dependent nature are inimitable and have high causal 
ambiguity to outsiders, rendering acquisitions more efficient to obtain the assets held 
by older targets. Besides, the salient moderation of interfirm governance experience 
resonates with the learning and spillover effects discussed in the learning literature.
The present study has some limitations that, at the same time, represent directions 
for future research. To begin with, our sample consists of acquisitions and alliances 
Fig. 2. The moderating effect of relative firm age on the relationship between resource 
deployment differences and the ally-versus-acquire choice
Fig. 3. The moderating effect of interfirm governance experience on the relationship between 
HR management differences and the ally-versus-acquire choice
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conducted by Taiwanese firms in high- and low-tech industrial sectors. Although we 
believe that this sampling frame provides a suitable platform for testing our conceptual 
framework, caution should be exercised in generalizing our results to other business or 
national settings. Second, this study aims to capture managers’ perception of interfirm 
differences and have carefully developed measurement. Future research may think to 
also devise objective measures for our constructs, and compare the effects of the two 
types of appraisals. Last, our identification of moderators is based on the theoretical 
argument central to key features of each interfirm difference. Future research can extend 
our conceptualization by considering other moderators. 
References
Abdi, M.; Aulakh, P. S. 2017. Locus of uncertainty and the relationship between contractual 
and relational governance in cross-border interfirm relationships, Journal of Management 43(3): 
771–803. https://doi.org/10.1177/0149206314541152
Alba, J. W.; Hasher, L. 1983. Is memory schematic?, Psychological Bulletin 93(2): 203–231. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.93.2.203
Barney, J. 1991. Firm resources and sustained competitive advantage, Journal of Management 
17(1): 99–120. https://doi.org/10.1177/014920639101700108 
Bauer, F.; Matzler, K. 2014. Antecedents of M&A success: the role of strategic complementarity, 
cultural fit, and degree and speed of integration, Strategic Management Journal 35(2): 269–291. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.2091
Carayannopoulos, S.; Auster, E. R. 2010. External knowledge sourcing in biotechnology through 
acquisition versus alliance: a KBV approach, Research Policy 39(2): 254–267. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2009.12.005 
Contractor, F. J.; Hsu, C.-C.; Kundu, S. K. 2005. Explaining export performance: a comparative 
study of international new ventures in Indian and Taiwanese software industry, Management 
International Review 45: 83–110.
Coviello, N. E.; Brodie, R. J.; Munro, H. J. 2000. An investigation of marketing practice by firm 
size, Journal of Business Venturing 15(5–6): 523–545. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0883-9026(98)00035-4
Cuypers, I. R. P.; Cuypers, Y.; Martin, X. 2017. When the target may know better: effects of 
experience and information asymmetries on value from mergers and acquisitions, Strategic Man-
agement Journal 38(3): 609–625. https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.2502
Czarnitzki, D.; Thorwarth, S. 2012. Productivity effects of basic research in low-tech and high-
tech industries, Research Policy 41(9): 1555–1564. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2012.04.009
Datta, D. K. 1991. Organizational fit and acquisition performance: effects of post-acquisition 
integration, Strategic Management Journal 12(4): 281–297. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.4250120404
Ellis, K. M.; Reus, T. H.; Lamont, B. T.; Ranft, A. L. 2011. Transfer effects in large acquisitions: 
how size-specific experience matters, Academy of Management Journal 54(6): 1261–1276. 
https://doi.org/10.5465/amj.2009.0122
Fonti, F.; Maoret, M.; Whitbred, R. 2017. Free-riding in multi-party alliances: the role of per-
ceived alliance effectiveness and peers’ collaboration in a research consortium, Strategic Manage-
ment Journal 38(2): 363–383. https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.2470
Fornell, C.; Larcker, D. F. 1981. Evaluating structural equation models with unobservable vari-
ables and measurement error, Journal of Marketing Research 18(1): 39–50. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/3151312
388
C.-H. Tseng. Solving the ally-versus-acquire dilemma through the dual lenses of subjective and objective views
Gerbing, D. W.; Anderson, J. C. 1988. An updated paradigm for scale development incorporating 
unidimensionality and its assessment, Journal of Marketing Research 25(2): 186–192. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/3172650
Ginsberg, A. 1994. Minding the competition: from mapping to mastery, Strategic Management 
Journal 15(S1): 153–174. https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.4250150911
Glendening, M.; Khurana, I. K.; Wang, W. 2016. The market for corporate control and dividend 
policies: cross-country evidence from M&A laws, Journal of International Business Studies 
47(9): 1106–1134. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41267-016-0028-x
Graffin, S. D.; Haleblian, J.; Kiley, J. T. 2016. Ready, AIM, acquire: impression offsetting and 
acquisitions, Academy of Management Journal 59(1): 232–252. 
https://doi.org/10.5465/amj.2013.0288
Grewal, R.; Cote, J. A.; Baumgartner, H. 2004. Multicollinearity and measurement error in 
structural equation models: implications for theory testing, Marketing Science 23(4): 519–529. 
https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.1040.0070
Guerrero, S. 2008. Changes in employees’ attitudes at work following an acquisition: a 
comparative study by acquisition type, Human Resource Management Journal 18(3): 216–236. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1748-8583.2008.00068.x
Hagedoorn, J.; Duysters, G. 2002. External sources of innovative capabilities: the preference for 
strategic alliances or mergers and acquisitions, Journal of Management Studies 39(2): 167–188. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-6486.00287
Hecker, D. E. 2005. High-technology employment: a NAICS-based update, Monthly Labor 
Review 128(7): 57–72.
Hoehn-Weiss, M. N.; Karim, S.; Lee, C.-H. 2017. Examining alliance portfolios beyond the dy-
ads: the relevancy of redundancy and nonuniformity across and between partners, Organization 
Science 28(1): 56–73. https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2017.1108
Holloway, S. S.; Parmigiani, A. 2016. Friends and profits don’t mix: the performance implications 
of repeated partnerships, Academy of Management Journal 59(2): 460–478. 
https://doi.org/10.5465/amj.2013.0581
Homburg, C.; Bucerius, M. 2006. Is speed of integration really a success factor of mergers and 
acquisitions? An analysis of the role of internal and external relatedness, Strategic Management 
Journal 27(4): 347–367. https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.520
Kile, C. O.; Phillips, M. E. 2009. Using industry classification codes to sample high-technology 
firms: analysis and recommendations, Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance 24(1): 35–58. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0148558X0902400104
Kogut, B.; Singh, H. 1988. The effect of national culture on the choice of entry mode, Journal 
of International Business Studies 19(3): 411–432. https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.jibs.8490394
Kor, Y.; Mahoney, J. T. 2005. How dynamics, management, and governance of resource 
deployments influence firm-level performance, Strategic Management Journal 26(5): 489–496. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.459
Kotha, R.; Zheng, Y.; George, G. 2011. Entry into new niches: the effects of firm age and the 
expansion of technological capabilities on innovative output and impact, Strategic Management 
Journal 32(9): 1011–1024. https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.915
Kramer, R. M. 1999. Trust and distrust in organizations: emerging perspectives, enduring questions, 
Annual Review of Psychology 50: 569–598. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.50.1.569 
Krishnan, R.; Geyskens, I.; Steenkamp, J. E. M. 2016. The effectiveness of contractual and trust-
based governance in strategic alliances under behavioral and environmental uncertainty, Strategic 
Management Journal 37(12): 2521–2542. https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.2469
Lavie, D.; Haunschild, P.; Khanna, P. 2012. Organizational differences, relational mechanisms, 
and alliance performance, Strategic Management Journal 33(13): 1453–1479. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.1987
389
Journal of Business Economics and Management, 2017, 18(3): 373–389
Lioukas, C. S.; Reuer, J. J.; Zollo, M. 2016. Effects of information technology capabilities on 
strategic alliances: implications for the resource-based view, Journal of Management Studies 
53(2): 161–183. https://doi.org/10.1111/joms.12179
Madsen, P. M.; Desai, V. 2010. Failing to learn? The effects of failure and success on organizational 
learning in the global orbital launch vehicle industry, Academy of Management Journal 53(3): 
451–476. https://doi.org/10.5465/AMJ.2010.51467631
Newbert, S. L. 2008. Value, rareness, competitive advantage, and performance: a conceptual-level 
empirical investigation of the resource-based view of the firm, Strategic Management Journal 
29(7): 745–768. https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.686
Nunnally, J. C.; Bernstein, I. H. 1994. Psychometric theory. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Oxley, J. E.; Sampson, R. C. 2004. The scope and governance of international R&D alliances, 
Strategic Management Journal 25(8–9): 723–749. https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.391
Podsakoff, P. M.; Organ, D. W. 1986. Self-reports in organizational research: problems and pros-
pects, Journal of Management 12(4): 531–544. https://doi.org/10.1177/014920638601200408
Reuer, J. J.; Devarakonda, S. V. 2016. Mechanism of hybrid governance: administrative commit-
tees in non-equity alliances, Academy of Management Journal 59(2): 510–533. 
https://doi.org/10.5465/amj.2012.0098
Som, A. 2003. Redesigning the human resources function at Lafarge, Human Resource 
Management 42(3): 271–288. https://doi.org/10.1002/hrm.10085
Tseng, C.-H.; Tansuhaj, P.; Hallagan, W.; McCullough, J. 2007. Effects of firm resources on 
growth in multinationality, Journal of International Business Studies 38(6): 961–974. 
https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.jibs.8400305
Wang, L.; Zajac, E. J. 2007. Alliance or acquisition? A dyadic perspective on interfirm resource 
combinations, Strategic Management Journal 28(13): 1291–1317. https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.638
Wang, H.; Zhao, S.; He, J. 2016. Increase in takeover protection and firm knowledge accumula-
tion strategy, Strategic Management Journal 37(12): 1453–1479. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.2443
Wassmer, U.; Li, S.; Madhok, A. 2017. Resource ambidexterity through alliance portfolios and 
firm performance, Strategic Management Journal 38(2): 2393–2412. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.2488
Wernerfelt, B. 1984. A resource-based view of the firm, Strategic Management Journal 5(2): 
171–180. https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.4250050207
Winter, S. G. 2003. Understanding dynamic capabilities, Strategic Management Journal 24(10): 
991–995. https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.318
Yang, H.; Lin, Z.; Lin, Y. 2010. A multilevel framework of firm boundaries: firm characteristics, 
dyadic differences, and network attributes, Strategic Management Journal 31(3): 237–261. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.815
Zhou, C.; Xie, J.; Wang, Q. 2016. Failure to complete cross-border M&As: “to” vs. “from” 
emerging markets, Journal of International Business Studies 47(9): 1077–1105. 
https://doi.org/10.1057/s41267-016-0027-y
Zollo, M. 2009. Superstitious learning with rare strategic decisions: theory and evidence from cor-
porate acquisitions, Organization Science 20(5): 894–908. https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.1090.0459
Chiung-Hui TSENG is Associate Professor at National Cheng Kung University in Taiwan. She 
received her PhD in International Business from Washington State University in the US. Her re-
search interests are alliances and acquisitions, foreign entry strategy, and firm diversification. Her 
publications have appeared in several SSCI journals, including Canadian Journal of Administrative 
Sciences, International Business Review, Journal of Business Economics and Management, Journal 
of International Business Studies, among others.
